In this paper, we empirically examine the impact of long-term client relationships on the performance ofbusiness service firms. On the basis of the information contained in the Compustat and Comnact Disclosure sets of databases, we find that, over the long run, relationship-oriented business service firms achieve higher returns on their investment than transaction-oriented firms. Importantly, our findings suggest that, unlike for relationshiporiented suppliers of business goods, such as component parts, long-term client relationships do not improve the productivity of relationship-oriented service firms. However, such relationships help business service firms resist price pressures from their customers and add more value to their services over time.
Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been an emerging trend toward long-term relationships among business customers and suppliers ofproducts and services. A number of customer firms have now adopted an approach of treating their suppliers as partners rather than adversaries. In turn, many suppliers have switched their strategy for servicing their customers from the traditional transaction-oriented approach to the more recent relationship-oriented approach.
Although the practice of long-term buyer-supplier relationships has grown in popularity, several important questions regarding how they benefit the partnering firms in the long run remain to be addressed. Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) , who examine the nature of manufacturer-supplier relationships, suggest that both buyers and suppliers might benefit from engaging each other in long-term relationships. They find that long-term relationships help streamline the operations and lower the inventory holding costs of suppliers of industrial goods, such as components and parts, the resulting savings from which are extracted by the buyers in the form of lower prices overtime. The benefit to the relationship-oriented suppliers of these goods comes in the form of lower selling and administrative expenses that offset the erosion in gross margins and enable them to achieve higher returns on their investment over time than their transaction-oriented counterparts. These findings suggest that whether ornot long-term relationships benefit suppliers in the long run depends on the severity of price pressures exerted by relational customers and the savings in selling expenses. Indeed, in related work, Balakrishnan, Linsmeier, and Venkatachalam (1996) do find that, from among suppliers engaged in just-in-time relationships with their customers, only those with a broad customer base are also able to resist price pressures and improve their profitability over time. On the other hand, iTT suppliers with a narrow customer base suffer declining profits over the long run.
It is important to note that the aforementioned studies as well as much of the other related academic inquiry in the area has largely focused on long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers of goods, not services. However, there is a growing trend toward the outsourcing of business services, and long-term relationships are gaining increasing importance in the marketing of services such as research, design, and engineering (Quinn and Ililmer 1994) ; financial services (Perrien, Filiatrault, and Ricard 1993) ; environment and waste management (Creele 1995) ; transportation and logistics (Beier and Cross 1993) ; and consulting (Frantz 1993; Walton 1993) . Therefore, there is presently a need to further improve our understanding of the nature of client-service provider relationships, in particular, the impact of such relationships on the longterm performance of service firms (Sheth and Sharma 1997) .
Based on what we know regarding the differences between how business customers buy services and products (Jackson, Neidell, and Lunsford 1995; Stock and Zinszer 1987) it is not apparent whether business clients and service providers would enjoy the same benefits from engaging each other in long-term relationships that manufacturers and suppliers of goods, such as components and parts, would. For instance, the production of most business services, unlike that of component and parts, is largely people-based and suchservices are typically not mass produced or inventoried at a centralized location. Given this difference, it is not clear whether and how long-term relationships will streamline the operations of service providers, improve their productivity, and lower their service delivery costs.
Further, clients associate great risk with the selection and replacement of service providers because they often find it difficult to set precise specifications for the services they wish to purchase (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985) as well as to evaluate all the attributes of a service provider prior to the actual delivery of the service (Berry 1995; Gronroos 1990; Stock and Zinszer 1987) . These perceptions of risk are known to reduce the importance of price in the decision process for the purchase of services (Ostrom and lacobucci 1995) . In addition, business clients actively participate in the delivery process of many services such as consulting, research, financial services, and information technology services. Consequently, the quality of service they receive depends, in part, on their own effort and inputs well as on the level of coordination that they are able to achieve with the service providers (Bostrom 1995; Beier and Cross 1993) . Why, then would relational clients increasingly put greater price pressures over their serviceproviders as time goes by? And, more importantly, why would service providers be vulnerable to such pressures? Finally, the consequential effects ofthe quality of many business services are significantly larger than the cost of procuring them (Day and Barksdale 1994) . For example, poorly conceived design, consulting, research, or engineering services can have a serious adverse impact on the buying firm. On the other hand, an exceptional performance on the delivery of such services can dramatically improve the buying firm's performance. However, customers often face great uncertainty with respect to the quality of these services because of the potentially large variability in inputs and outputs (Lovelock and Wright 1999) . Successful long-term relationships enable customers to observe the performance of the service provider over time and reduce their perceived uncertainty associated with the quality of services yet to be received.
Under such circumstances, would relational suppliers feel increased pressure on the purchase price or on service quality?
In this paper, we address the questions raised above, and use data contained in the Com~ustat and Compact Disclosure sets of financial databases to examine the impact of longterm client relationships on the financial performance ofbusiness service firms. Our methodology for sample selection and hypothesis testing is similar to that of Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) , who investigated the impact of long-term relationships on suppliers of goods, such as components and parts. We first identify a set of business service finns that were engaged in long-term relationships with their customers. For each of these firms we then identify a matching control firm that used a transactional approach to managing its customers. We finally compare the performance over time ofthese matched pairs of firms. Overall, our empirical findings suggest that relationship-oriented business service firms do achieve superior returns on their investment in the long run than their transaction-oriented counterparts. However, there are several key differences between how these relationships affect the costs and prices ofbusiness service firms versus what has been reported for component parts suppliers. On the one hand, we find that long-term client relationships do not increase the productivity of business service firms and do not lower their service delivery costs. On the other hand, we also find that these relationships do not expose business service firms to excessive price pressures over time and, in fact, help them maintain their gross margins. It appears from our findings that business clients do not engage service providers in long-term relationships with the objective of driving down the cost of procurement. Rather, they form such relationships to enable service firms to add more value to their offerings over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we briefly discuss the nature of long-term relationships between business service finns and their clients. Next, we present our hypotheses pertaining to the impact of these long-term relationships on the performance ofbusiness service firms. Thereafter, we discuss our methodology, data, and the operationalization of the variables of interest. Finally, we present our empirical findings, discuss their managerial implications, and offer some concluding comments.
Business Services and Long-Term Relationships
There are several potential benefits that both clients and service providers can derive from engaging each other in long-term relationships. First, most business servicerelationships, much like the service delivery process itself, are largely people-based, and the quality of the delivered service depends critically on the interpersonal interactions among the boundary spanners of the partnering firms (Berry 1983 ). As relationships strengthen over a period of time, the service providers' personnel often assume the role of outsourced departments and make critical decisions on behalf of their clients. The interaction among boundary spanners becomes even more critical when service providers, such as engineering consultants, have to actively participate in a network of multifirm relationships, such as those with builders, contractors, inspectors, and suppliers, on behalfof their clients. These repeated interactions among the clients' and service providers' boundary spanners result in social bonds that increase trust in the relationship and consequently the value of service providers to their clients.
Further, over time, the clients' boundary spanners become familiar with the operations and procedures of their counterparts in the supplier firms. In this regard, long-term relationships become a source of reassurance to the clients and serve as implicit performance guarantees (Spekman, Strauss, and Smith 1985) . These relationships are especially important forbusiness services because, unlike what they do for incoming components and parts, many clients don't have ongoing institutionalized programs forthe measurement and control of the quality of service they receive. Service contracts, by themselves, are no safeguard because they typically specify only a series of actions rather than outcomes. And often, even the ongoing monitoring of service providers only ensures that the service firm adheres to the necessary procedures rather than either improves quality or lowers service delivery costs. As a result, clients feel vulnerable when they purchase services because they have less knowledge than the service provider regarding what transpires in a "black box" service perfonnance (van't Haaff 1989) . Under such circumstances, successful ongoing relationships reduce clients' perceptions of vulnerability and help them reduce their monitoring costs. In turn, relational service providers are able to gain scope advantages over time because they reduce the clients' perceptions of the risks involved in transacting additional related business with them.
Over time, relationships also help service firms become extensions of their client organizations. Relational service firms are therefore better able to understand their clients' service needs as well as to collaborate and coordinate with their clients' personnel. This resulting mutual learning process enhances the client-specific, distinctive capability of relational service providers and enables them to add more value to their offerings than could an outside competitor. The added value, in turn, increases clients' switching costs and becomes a critical source of competitive advantage for such service providers (Christopher, Payne, and Ballantyne 1991).
Successful client relationships also enhance service providers' reputations and provide them with a set of established showcase accounts. These accounts are especially important for business services because word-of-mouth and referrals play a critical role in the selection of service providers (Day and Barksdale 1992) . Long-term relationships, therefore, help service providers win additional new business because new clients cannot ex-ante verify the quality of services they are likely to receive and often select service providers on the basis of recommendations from other clients.
Finally, long-term relationships are also attractive for business service firms because they typically do not involve large additional investments in relationship-specific tangible assets that cannot be recovered in the event of a termination of a relationship (Levinthal and Fichman 1988) .
Consequently, business service firms typically do not face additional financial risks in the form of large fixed costs merely because of engaging their clients in long-term relationships. Of course, this may not be true for select, capital intensive business services, such as telecommunication services.
Statement of Hypotheses
We next state our specific hypotheses pertaining to the impact of long-term relationships on the revenues, costs, prices, and profits ofbusiness service firms.
Impact of Long-Term Service Relationships on the Level of Sales
Relationship-oriented service providers can achieve superior sales growth for several reasons. First, extended relationships bind clients and service providers together through noncontractual commitments and enhance the level ofmutual trust between them (Dion, Easterling, and Miller 1995; Oster 1990 ). This increase in the level of trust over time as well as repeated service encounters reduces the uncertainty surrounding clients' perceptions of the quality of the delivered service. The reduced uncertainty regarding service quality helps clients reduce the cost of monitoring the service provider as well as increases their perceived relative risk of buying from potential "out" competitors of the incumbent in~~service firm. Further, long-term clients develop social relationships with service firms and are consequently more tolerant of service failures (Crosby and Stephens 1987) . Relational service providers can therefore maintain a large proportion oftheir sales because they are likely to be insulated from the adverse effects of high client turnover.
Second, because clients cannot ex-ante verify the quality of the service they would receive, word-of-mouth plays an important role in the selection of service firms (Jackson, Neidell, and Lunsford 1995) . Therefore, service firms who have satisfactory long-term relationships with theirclients may be able to increase their sales, both to other divisions within an existing buyer firm as well as to new buyer firms.
Finally, over time, relational service firms can gather critical information about the needs of their clients and can use it to gain scope advantages by exploiting cross-selling opportunities (Bharadwaj, Vardarajan, and Fahy 1993) . These opportunities arise because clients in long-term relationships are more likely to use existing service firms for related services than to increase their risks by trying out new ones (Corey 1991) . For instance, clients who use an information technology firm for software support are often likely to use the same firm for services related to the evaluation and selection ofrelated hardware. Overall, relationship-oriented service firms can experience a high level of sales growth because of restricted client switching, enhanced reputation, and expansion of scope.
Of course, a long-term focus on existing clients often requires service firms to overspecialize and dedicate their critical resources only to these clients (Jackson and Cooper 1988) . This specialization may not leave enough free resources for market development and the acquisition ofnew clients. Further, relational clients often dissuade their service providers from acquiring new ones because of concerns that it would lead to a redeployment of critical resources, such as design experts, consultants, orcreative personnel. Therefore, service firms that focus on existing clients can lose sales because of their inability to use some of their strengths to exploit alternative market opportunities. Overall, we hypothesize that:
Ill: Service firms in long-term relationships with their clients are able to attain a higher level of sales growth than service firms that do not engage their clients in long-term relationships .
Impact of Long-Term Service Relationships on Selling Prices
Service firms compete in the marketplace on the basis of their distinctive capabilities (Day and Wensley 1988) . Some ofthese capabilities, such as the superior skills of their personnel or their operating systems, are intrinsic to these firms and are valuable to potential as well as current clients. However, relationship-oriented service firms develop additional, clientspecific, capabilities over time that enable them to add more value to their services.
Consequently, long-term clients perceive a "capability gap" between the "in" service firms and their potential "out" competitors (Coyne 1985) . This perceived gap enables relational service providers to resist price pressures from their clients and sometimes charge higher prices than would be possible by potential competitors.
Further, there is anecdotal evidence that clients that continue to have long-term relationships with service firms tend to purchase full price services over time (Reicbheld and Sasser 1990) . Therefore, even though service firms have to compete on price to acquire a client and initiate a relationship, their ability to charge full prices for their services increases as the scope ofthe relationship expands. Finally, over time, clients get used to the procedures that are put in place to coordinate with an existing service firm (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987) .
This procedural specificity tends to lock in clients and increase their switching costs (Heidi and John 1990) . Relational service firms can extract some ofthese switching costs by charging higher prices over time.
On the other hand, relational service firms often have to provide large initial discounts to their clients at the pre-relationship stage, that is, at the time when the client is searching for new service providers (Ford 1990 ). Clients often negotiate such discounts at the pre-relationship stage, because they realize their limitations with regard to driving prices down once the relationship develops and matures. As a result, relational service providers might have to wait for long periods of time before theirrelationships becomes institutionalized and they are able to raise their prices. Overall, we hypothesize that: ~j~: Service firms in long-term relationships with their clients are able to obtain hiaher prices over time than service firms that do not engage their clients in long-term relationships .
Impact of Long-Term Service Relationships on Service Deliverv Costs
Relationship-oriented service firms may be able to decrease their service delivery costs over time for several reasons. First, from a transactions cost perspective, relational service firms can develop economies of information exchange with their clients through common training, experience, and repeated interpersonal interactions (Williamson 1971 (Williamson , 1975 . Second, sustained relationships with select clients can also lead to an enhanced organizational learning, that is, an improvement in skills and abilities through learning within the organization. Relationshiporiented service firms can therefore increase the productivity and efficiency of individual groups of workers by exploiting experience curve effects. Centralizing account processing for various services can help relational service firms achieve additional efficiencies (Bharadwaj, Vardarajan, and Fahy 1993 ). An enhancement in the level of efficiency forthe reasons outlined above can reduce a relational firm's service delivery costs over time.
On the other hand, clients in long-term relationships are relatively more demanding.
They often require dedicated teams ofpeople, such as consultants, designers, inspectors, and account managers, to service their accounts for extended periods of time. Such requirements tend to reduce the mobility and overlap of critical personnel across client accounts and tend to increase the number of employees of relational service firms. As a result, these firms often have to sacrifice productivity in order to sustain the satisfaction levels oftheir long-term clients (Anderson, Fornell, and Rust 1997) . Second, because the production and consumption of services is inseparable, it is often difficult for service firms to achieve operational efficiencies by mass producing or stocking services at a central location (Bharadwaj, Vardarajan, and Fahy 1993) . Even if a service firm has select large client accounts, its services are often delivered independently at multiple client sites. These services are typically not standardized and have to be customized, often on a per-job or project basis (Jackson and Cooper 1988) . Furthermore, there is often a large variance in the demand rate forproject-based services, such as consulting, engineering, oil-field services, real estate services, and event planning (Bateson 1995) . Finally, relational clients often expect service firms to provide additional services above and beyond those specified in the contract. For example, engineering firms often assist their clients in the appraisal of vendors and consultants often help with market research. Overall, the limited ability to standardize and mass produce, the demand uncertainty, and the lack of flexibility with regard to the deployment of critical resources is likely to prevent relationship-oriented service firms from reducing their service delivery costs over time.
Overall, the extent to which relational service firms are able to lower their service delivery costs will depend on the relative impact of the two sets of countervailing forces on the deployment of their critical resources, in particular their human resources. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
3: Service firms in long-term relationships with select clients have the same level of arowth in their service deliverv costs as service firms that do not engage their clients in long-term relationships .
Imnact of Long-Term Service Relationships on Selling Exvenses
Selling, general, and administrative costs are a major portion of firms' discretionary fixed expenses. Because these costs are likely to be positively related to client turnover, we expect that relationship-oriented service firms, by virtue ofhaving a relatively stable client base, may have lower selling costs over time than their transaction-oriented counterparts (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995) .
On the other hand, it is known that clients in extended relationships with their service providers are more demanding than those who are not engaged in such relationships. It is possible, therefore, that relationship-oriented service providers may have higher selling expenses than their transaction-oriented counterparts because ofthe high cost of managing each individual relationship. Overall, we hypothesize that:
i4: Service firms in long-term relationships with select clients have lower selling, general, and administrative costs over time than service firms that do not engage their clients in long-term relationships .
Imoact of Long-Term Service Relationships on Overall Profitability
Overall, relationship-oriented service firms can achieve superior long-term profitability for several reasons. First, sustained relationships with select clients allow time for crossfertilization of ideas and reduce the risks associated with the development and marketing of new services. Second, relationship-oriented service firms can utilize their distinctive competencies more efficiently by taking advantage of the knowledge of their clients' personnel (Frey and Scholesser 1993) . Third, relationships enable service firms to become full-service providers to their clients, which, in turn, allows them to market service bundles that include high margin services (Slofstra 1993) . On the cost front, relationship-oriented service firms are able to participate in the co-development of specifications and may be able to achieve cost efficiencies.
Finally, the development or sustained of long-term relationships does not require service firms to invest heavily in immovable, relationship-specific tangible assets.
On the other hand, developing long-term relationships with select clients might not leave enough free resources for service providers to take advantage ofnew and potentially more profitable opportunities. Transaction-oriented service providers may, therefore, sometimes be in a better position to continuously adjust their client base and pick and choose more profitable accounts over time. Overall, we hypothesize that:
115: Service firms in long-term relationships with select clients achieve superior profitabiliw over time than service firms that do not engage their clients in long-term relationships
.
Data
We tested hypotheses H 1 through 115 using data extracted from the Compustat database.
This database contains financial and textual information contained in the annual reports of publicly traded firms. In addition, the business segment level database in Compustat also lists the names of the major customers of each firm and the annual volume of business transacted with them.
Our methodology for sample selection and hypothesis testing is similar to that adopted by Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) . The underlying assumption behind the sample selection process was that relationship-oriented firms are likely to retain the same set of customers over time, whereas transaction-oriented firms are likely to experience high customer turnover and not retain the same customers over a long period of time. We identified these relationship-oriented and transaction-oriented firms based on statutory information on a firm's principal customers contained in the business segment part of the Compustat database.
We first selected a set ofbusiness service firms that maintained a long-term relationship with their clients during the period of the study. We shall refer to these firms as the LTR (longterm relationship-oriented) or treatment firms. For each firm in the LTR sample, we then selected a matching firm that was similar to the LTR firm in several respects but did not maintain a long-term relationship with its clients. We shall refer to this set of matching firms as the TRA (transactional) or control firms. We tested our hypotheses by comparing the performance, over time, of these pairs of matched treatment and control firms. The procedure that we followed for selecting the treatment and control firms is outlined below.
The Treatment Sample: The overall objective of the treatment sample selection process was to identify those firms that sold a significant portion of their services to the same set of customers over an extended period of time, which was six years in our study. We first scanned the descriptions of the SIC codes in the Compustat database to identify the 4-digit SIC codes that correspond to business services. Within these SIC codes, we identified firms that operated only within a single business segment. We imposed this restriction because relationships are typically formed at a business segment level, whereas some of the performance measures we are interested in are reported at the firm level. We then examined the names of the principal customers of each firm to determine whether the firm retained the same customers over a period of time. The
Com~ustat database contains the names of up to four principal customers each of which accounted for at least 10 percent of the sales of the firm. Based on this information, we retained only those firms in the treatment sample that sold a substantial portion of their service to the same set of customer(s) every year for six years.
The Control Sample: The overall objective of the control sample selection process was to identify one transactional firm for every firm in the LTR sample such that the two firms were similar in many respects except that the LTR firm had long-term relationships with its clients and the transactional firm did not. Therefore, for each LTR firm, we confined the search to the list of firms that operated within the same 4-digit SIC code as the target LTR firm. From this list, we selected firms that operated in the same business segment as the target firm. This list was further narrowed to only those firms that either did not report any principal customer in any year or did not have the same customer listed as a principal customer in more than one year of the six years considered. Finally, from this restricted set, we chose that firm as the matching control firm whose sales in the initial period of the study was the closest to the sales of the target LTR firm.
This multi-step procedure ensured that an LTR firm and its matched transactional firm were of similar size, were from the same 4-digit SIC codes, had similar businesses descriptions, but differed in their approach to servicing their clients. Whereas the treatment firm engaged its customers in long-term relationships, the control firm serviced its clients on a transactional basis.
We used a staggered sample corresponding to the period 1986 to 1994 for our empirical analysis. Within this period, we identified firms that maintained long-term relationships with their clients for at least six years. We shall refer to the first and second years of the six-year period for which we use data for a particularpair of firms as the initial period and to the fifth and sixth years as the final period. In order to reduce the effects of short-term year-to-year variation in the performance of the firms in our sample, we computed the average values of the variables of interest for each fn-m for both the initial and the final periods. We then tested our hypotheses by comparing the average values ofthese variables for the treatment and control firms in the two periods. Our methodology yielded a sample of 72 pairs of firms from a range ofbusiness services, including environment and waste management, research and development, design and engineering, marketing research, consulting, oilfield services, information management services, and transportation services. In the initial period, the average annual sales for the LTR firms in the sample were $58 million.
Dependent Variables: We used the net sales of the service firms to test the hypothesis pertaining to the effect of long-term relationships on sales. As mentioned, the Com~ustat database does not provide us with information on how firms price their services. Therefore, it is not possible to use the data to directly parse out the effects of long-term relationships on firms' costs and prices. We were led therefore to indirectly examine the direction of these effects by using the available data on related variables such as gross margins and selected elements of costs. We first examined whether, over time, the gross margins of the treatment finns grew at a slower or faster rate than those of the control firms. Next, we investigated the changes in selected elements of the cost structure of the treatment and control firms over time to draw inferences regarding increases in productivity or reduction in service delivery costs. In this pursuit, we relied on the observation that the operations of most business services firms such as those included in our sample, tend to be people intensive (Wilson and Smith 1996) . Consequently, an improvement in the efficiency and an increase in the productivity of such firms typically manifests itself as savings in labor costs. In fact, the most commonly used measure for assessing the productivity changes among such firms is their sales per employee (Anderson, Fomell, and Rust, 1997; Ip 1997; Rose 1995) .
Therefore, we examined the trends in the sales per employee of the treatment and control firms to draw inferences regarding changes in their service delivery costs. Finally, we used the firms' returns on investment as a measure oftheir overall profitability. Return on investment is defined as a finn's pretax profit expressed as a percentage of its total assets. Publicly traded firms are currently not required to report the value of their assets at market prices. Therefore, in the data contained in the Compustat database, these assets are valued at their historical prices.
Methodology
The distribution of the dependent variables showed significant departures from normality.
Therefore, we tested our hypotheses using non-parametric tests that are more robust to departures from normality than the conventional t-tests. Specifically, for each dependent variable of interest, we report results from a set of four z-statistics based on Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests (Figure 1 ). A combination of the first and second tests allowedus to examine whether there was a systematic variation in the dependent variable between the two samples from the initial to the final period. The third and the fourth tests provided additional diagnostic information regarding whether the temporal difference in the dependent variable across the two samples, if any, was because of a change in the dependent variable forthe treatment sample, the control sample, or both.
Results
We report the results from tests 1 though 4 for each dependent variable in Table 1 and the control firms ($57.24m) was not statistically significant (z 1 = 0.52, p > 0.10). This is an expected result because we matched the two sets of firms based on the levels of their net sales in the initial period. Similarly, we find that, in the final period, the sales of the treatment firms ($98.65m) were slightly higher than those of the control firms ($91.1 im), although the difference between the two was not statistically significant (z2 = 0.99, p > 0.10). The absence of a significant difference between the average sales of the treatment and control firms in the two periods also suggests that the observed pattern ofresults for the other dependant variables, that may otherwise be related to the level of sales, is probably not driven by statistical regression effects.
The results from the within treatment and control sample tests (z 3 = 5.85, and z4 = 6.14, p <0.01 forboth) reveal that both the treatment and control firms registered significant sales growthbetween the initial and final periods. Overall, the results from the fourtests suggest that, at least during the study period, the treatment firms did not suffer a loss of revenue by following a relationship-oriented strategy. On the other hand, it is also useful to note that the transactionoriented service firms were also able to keep pace, presumably by serving new clients who entered the growing market. It is worth noting that our findings on gross margins for business service firms are different from those reported by Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) for suppliers of products.
Specifically, our data do not support the hypothesis that relationship-oriented service firms face increasing price pressures over time and suffer a greater decline in their gross margins than their transaction-oriented counterparts. Our results suggest that, over time, relational service providers might, in fact, be better at preserving their gross margins than their transaction-oriented counterparts.
Service Delivery Costs: The results from the tests pertaining to the sales per employee are given in Figure 2 (c). The results from the within treatment and control sample tests (z3 = 4.02 and z4 = 3.62, p <0.01 forboth) reveal that both the treatment and control firms registered a significant growth in their respective sales per employee from the initial period to the final period.
However, the difference between the sales per employee of the two sets of firms was statistically not significant either in the initial period (z 1 = -0.15, p > 0.10) or in the final period (z2 = -0.37, p >0.10).
These results provide indirect support to our hypothesis that there are probably few, if any, differential cost advantages that accrue to relationship-oriented business service firms as a direct result of their developing long-term relationships with their clients. Further, if we view these results in conjunction with those on gross margins, it appears that relational service firms are better able to protect their margins over time than their transaction-oriented counterparts, not because of savings in service delivery costs but probably because ofthe ability to maintain their prices. Both of these findings are contrary to what Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) have reported for relationship-oriented suppliers of products. We do not find evidence that supports the hypotheses that, over time, relational service firms become more operationally efficient than their transaction-oriented counterparts or that they face increasing pricepressures from their customers which shrink their gross margins.
Selling. General, and Administrative Expenses: The results from the tests pertaining to selling, general, and administrative expenses are given in Figure 2(d) . The results from the initial period sample difference test (z1 = -2.47, p <0.01) and the final period sample difference test (z2 = -2.90, p <0.01) reveal that the mean selling, general, and administrative expenses for the treatment firms were significantly lower than those for the control firms in both the initial period and the final period. Further, the results from the within treatment and control sample tests (z3 = -0.39 and z4 = 0.93, p > 0.10 forboth) reveal that, over time, the mean selling expenses for the treatment firms fell somewhat from 30.09 percent to 25.02 percent, whereas those for the control firms increased from 36.6 percent to 37.2 percent. The net result of these changes is that the gap in these expenses between the treatment and control firms widened from the initial period to the final period. The inference that we can draw from these results is that relational service firms had lower fixed marketing expenses throughout the study period, presumablybecause ofhaving a narrow and stable base of clients and lower client turnover.
Return on Investment: The results from the tests of the hypotheses pertaimng to returns on investment are given in Figure 2 (e). We find that over the period of the study, whereas the average return on assets of the treatment firms remained unchanged at around 3.16 percent (z 3=0.44, p> 0.10), the return on assets ofthe control firms suffered a marginally significant decline from 1.48 percent to -0.79 percent (z4 = -1.26, p < 0.11). As a result, the gap between the return on asset of the treatment firms and the control firms became larger and statistically significant from the initial period (z1 = 1.22, p <0.11) to the final period (z2 = 1.90, p <0.05).
These overall trends can be attributed to our earlier findings on sales, costs, and prices.
Relational service providers maintained their sales growth over time vis-a-vis transactional service providers. Further, they were able to maintain their margins and incurred lower sales, general, and administrative expenses. The net result is that they achieved a higher return on assets over time than their transaction-oriented counterparts.
Validation of Results
In this study, we categorized a business service firm as being relationship-oriented or transaction-oriented based on what it did and not what it said. Specifically, every firm classified as an LTR fu-m in our sample retained at least one major customer continuously for a period of six years. Conversely, every matching control firm either did not have any major customer that accounted for a significant portion of its revenues or did not have the same major customer in any two of the six periods considered. It is quite possible that the LTR firms in our sample actually did not have a long-term relationship but merely had a sequence oflarge transactions with the same set of clients. On the other hand, it is also possible that some of the control firms had long-term relationships with large numbers of small clients. Therefore, we looked for additional evidence regarding the content of each relationship to increase the level of our confidence in our classification of the firms as either relational or transactional.
Our overall objective was to further confine the sample to only those pairs of firms where the LTR firm acknowledged that the relationships with its client(s) were indeed long-term in nature and the control firm did not. We therefore scanned the Compact Disclosure database to collect additional evidence for the relationship-orientation of the firms in our sample based on the textual information contained in their annual reports. We specifically examined whether a target treatment firm had explicitly acknowledged an ongoing relationship with one or more of its clients, customized its services, or invested research and development resources to meet the specific needs of its clients. We found that, from among the 72 treatment firms in our sample, 35 met this additional criterion. None of their matching control firms met the criterion. The following are some of the statements contained in the annual reports of the treatment firms in the reduced sample of firms:
In both relationships, we're doing more than saving our partners money by handling their data better and faster.. ..We're also helping their core business by adding value to their mission-critical data through our three core competencies: software systems development, datacenter management, and information management technology.
We are concentrating on a strategy of focused marketing, management, and technical excellence.. .,managers ask for and receive periodic feedback from every major client account in the form of a Quality of Service Report.
We have built equity in these long-term relationships, and as our organization evolves with the demands of an ever-changing market, we always keep in mind the needs of those clients who pioneered the industry with us.
We are also successfully transitioning to providing customized, value added services for long-term business partners.
• ..from being a passive contributor to our clients' objectives to becoming an accountable partner in driving their business results.
enjoys excellent long-standing relationships with many of its clients...
We repeated our earlier analyses, while confining ourselves to the data pertaining only to this reduced sample of 35 pairs of firms. The results from these additional analyses are reported in Table 1 (b) and in Figures 3(a) through 3(e) . The sample sizes for some of these analyses are relatively small, once again because ofmissing values.
The results fornet sales, reported in Figure 3 (a), reveal trends that are similar to those observed for the full sample. We find that, although both the treatment firms as well as the control finns experienced significant sales growth from the initial period to the final period (z 3 =3.78 and z4 = 4.04, p <0.01), the difference between the average sales of the two sets of firms was not statistically significant either in the initial period (z1 = -0.29, p > 0.10)) orin the final period (z2 = -0.29, p > 0.10).
The results for gross margins, reported in Figure 3 (b), reveal that, whereas the treatment firms experienced a marginal increase in their gross margins from the initial period to the final period (z3 = 1.30, p <0.10), the control firms suffered a marginal decline over the same period (z4=-1.50, p <0.10). As a result, the gap between the gross margins of the treatment and control firms narrowed from the initial period to the final period (z1 = -1.77, p< 0.05, and z2 = -1.34, p < 0.10 respectively).
The results pertaining to sales per employee are reported in Figure 3 (c). The trends in these results are, again, consistent with those for the full sample. We find that, whereas both the treatment and the control firms registered a significant improvement in their respective sales per employee (z3 =2.70 and z4 = 2.86 respectively, p <0.01 for both), the difference across the two sets of firms was not statistically significant either in the initial period (z1 = -0.31, p > 0.10) or in the final period (z2 = -0.58, p > 0.10).
The results for selling, general, and administrative expenses, reported in Figure 3 (d), are somewhat consistent with the findings forthe full sample. We find that although, as expected, these expenses were marginally lower for treatment firms, both in the initial period (z1 = -0.95, p > 0.10), as well as in the final period (z2 = -1.21, p < 0.11), there is probably no incremental increase in these savings during the period of study. We find that the selling, general, and administrative expenses declined for both sets of firms during the period of study (z3 =-0.84, p> 0.10, and z4=-l.10, p >0.10 respectively).
Finally, as reported in Figure 3 (e), we find that, whereas, during the period of the study, the treatment firms were able to maintain their return on assets (z 3 = 0.31, p > 0.10), the control firms faced a decline (z4 = -1.87, p < 0.05). As a result, the gap between the return on assets for the two sets of firms increased from the initial period (z1 = 0.80, p > 0.10) to the final period (z2 = 2.50, p < 0.01).
Overall, the major trends observed in our data forthe reduced sample are very similar to those found in the full sample. We find that, over time, relationship-oriented firms in the reduced sample were able to achieve similar levels of sales growth but higher returns on their investment than their transaction-oriented counterparts. Again, the improvement in the profitability of relationship-oriented service firms was not because of savings in service delivery costs, but because oftheir ability to maintain their prices and have lower selling, general, and administrative costs.
7. Discussion Berry (1983) suggested that the acquisition of customers should be viewed only as an intermediate step in the marketing process and that service firms should constantly strive to customize their offerings to their clients in order to encourage customer loyalty. The results from our initial inquiry into the financial consequences of such a relationship-oriented strategy are consistent with his suggestion. We find that, over time, the revenue growth of relationshiporiented business service firms matches that of their transaction-oriented counterparts. More importantly, these relational firms are able to achieve higher returns on their investments over the long run than transactional firms. These results suggest that, on average, it is in the interest of business serviceproviders to develop and sustain long-term relationships with their clients rather than conduct business on a transactional basis.
Our findings however suggest that the nature of long-term business service relationships may be somewhat different from that of conventional buyer-supplier relationships. It is generally believed that buyer-supplier relationships, especially if they are also associated with a reduction in the roster of suppliers, result in lower costs for the buyer because of greater operating efficiencies, fewer defects, and greater pricing power. However, our data do not support the hypotheses that business service relationships also improve service providers' operations or increase clients' ability to systematically extract away the gross margins of service providers.
Why then would business clients enter into long-term relationships with their service providers? We did not directly address this issue in this paper because our focus was on the impact of such relationships on the service providers. However, based on our data, we would conjecture that the value addition for clients in long-term service relationships may not come from price reductions but from superior service quality. As we mentioned earlier, ongoing relationships may enhance service quality as a result of a combination of several forces, including superior coordinationwith the service provider and better control over the service provider's critical resources. On the other hand, the lackof direct opportunities for cost cutting may be a result of several other factors such as an absence of economies of scale, the relative lack of standardization of the services procured, and the inability to correctly forecast demand and enhance resource utilization.
Despite the fact that long-term client relationships offer few opportunities for cost savings, relational service firms still perform better than transactional service firms over the long run. They achieve the same level of sales growth as their counterparts and do not face increased price pressures from their clients. The relative stability of their operating margins and lower selling and administrative expenses result in their superior profitability over the long run. Our results suggest that when service firms initiate a relationship with theirclient, then, unlike component part suppliers, they should not expect to see an increase in operating efficiency over time. Rather they should focus on enhancing service quality and defending their gross margins by trying to increase their clients' switching costs.
Limitations and Directions forFuture Research
Our study is an initial inquiry into the impact of long-term relationships on the performance of business service firms. In this section, we discuss the limitations of our study and outline some avenues for future research.
First, in this study, we classified firms as being relational or transactional based on the stability, or lack thereof, of their client list, as well as the textual information contained in their annual reports. The nature of our data did not permit us to explicitly measure the degree of a firm's relationship orientation. As a result, although ourresults do provide some useful insights into the nature ofbusiness service relationships, there are several limitations to our study that warrant further refinements. First, we were not able to identify those firms that might have been relationship-oriented but did not have any major customerthat accounted formore than 10 percent of their sales. Further, we categorized firms in our sample into two distinct classes depending on whether they met or failed to meet certain rigid criteria. It is conceivable that service firms can be placed on a continuum from being purely transaction-orientated to being purely relationship-orientated and that there is an optimum somewhere in between, where these firms make the greatest amount of profit. To address these and other related issues, future work in the area should focus on developing scales to measure the relationship orientation of business service firms. Although several scales might have to be proposed to measure the various dimensions of what might constitute relationship-orientation, we suggest that a starting point would be to conceptualize service relationships as social relationships embedded in an economic context. Therefore, it might be useful to include measures ofboth the economic dimension of long-term orientation (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993) , as well as the social dimension of work group functioning (Friedlander 1971) in such scales. Such scales will provide an alternative mechanism for classifying firms as well as examining the relationship betweenthe degree of a firm's relationship orientation and its financial performance.
Second, although our findings suggest that business service relationships may be different from the conventional buyer-supplier relationships, we did not explicitly investigate the underlying factors that drive these differences. Our focus was on outcomes rather than processes. Inquiries into the process of the formation and management of business service relationships and into the differences among the incentives of buyers, suppliers, and service providers to enter into long-term relationships offer a potentially rich area for future research.
Finally, it should be noted that our findings pertain to a time period when the primary demand for business services was growing. It would be useful and interesting to see whether or not these findings replicate during periods when there is a shrinkage in the primary demand for these services. Based on our findings, we conjecture that, under such a scenario, the relational firms might actually do even better than transactional firms. The reason is that, while relational service firms will be able to retain their clients, transactional firms will have to engage in price competition to generate sales volumes. 
